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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Each environmental tax in the United States is designed to collect reve-
nue for a trust fund used to clean up a particular pollution problem. Each
might be intended to collect from a particular industry thought to be
responsible for that pollution problem, but none represents a good exam-
ple of an incentive-based tax designed to discourage the polluting activ-
ity itself.
A different tax for each trust fund means that each tax rate is typically
less than 1 percent. But each separate tax has an extra cost of administra-
tion and compliance, since taxpayers must read another set of rules and
fill out another set of forms. This paper provides evidence on compliance
costs that are high relative to the small revenue from each separate tax.
In addition, an inputoutput model is used to show how current U.S.
environmental tax burdens are passed from taxed industries to all other
industries. Thus, the extra cost incurred to administer each separate tax
achieves neither targeted incentives nor targeted burdens.
This paper was prepared for presentation at the National Bureau of Economic Research
Conference on Tax Policy and the Economy, Washington, D.C., November 7, 1995. I am
grateful for excellent research assistance from Patricia Saydah, financial assistance from the
NBER and National Science Foundation grant SBR-9413334, and helpful suggestions from
Tom Barthold, Bruce Davie, Virginia McConnell, Peter Merrill, Jim Poterba, Seng-su
Tsang, Margaret Walls, and Randy Weiss. This paper is part of the NBER Research Pro-
gram in Public Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and not those of
the National Science Foundation or the NBER.34Fullerton
1. INTRODUCTION
Many economists and policymakers are beginning to discuss potential
gains from better coordination of environmental policy and tax policy. If
properly designed, certain taxes can help prevent environmental harm
while raising revenue that can be used to reduce other distorting taxes or
to feed a trust fund for the cleanup of existing environmental problems.
Yet the design of such taxes is difficult. Even without coordination,
environmental policy and tax policy must each strike a balance among
competing economic and political objectives. With attempts to coordi-
nate these policies, the trade-offs become all the more complicated.
This paper is concerned with the design of taxes that might coordinate
environmental and tax policies and with the trade-off among three par-
ticular objectives. First, a tax might be designed to discourage an activity
that causes environmental harm. A tax on vehicle emissions, for exam-
ple, would provide incentives to reduce emissions by fixing the vehicle's
pollution control equipment, scrapping old vehicles, driving less aggres-
sively, or reducing total mileage.
Second, a tax might be designed to place its burden on those responsi-
ble for a particular environmental problem. This objective relates to fair-
ness rather than incentives. The tax on vehicle emissions would meet
both objectives because it would discourage the polluting activity while
collecting from those responsible. But environmental taxes do not neces-
sarily meet both objectives. The emissions tax may soon be feasible, but
it is not yet in place. Meanwhile, the United States relies on a combina-
tion of other policies, including a tax on gasoline. This tax does collect
from those who drive vehicles and are thus responsible for the pollution,
but it does not provide incentives to fix pollution control equipment or
otherwise reduce emissions per mile driven.
Third, a tax might be designed to minimize administrative cost to the
government and compliance cost imposed on taxpayers. The same exam-
ple highlights the trade-off among these objectives: a tax on vehicle
emissions might have better incentives to reduce emissions, but it would
be difficult and therefore costly to administer. The gasoline tax might
provide the best balance among objectives: since it has some of the
desired incentives to reduce driving, it places its burden on those who
emit pollutants, and it is easily collected.
In discussing these three objectives, this paper abstracts from many
other interesting problems and objectives of policy. Also, the paper does
not attempt a comprehensive evaluation of all U.S. environmental taxes.
Any tax may have environmental effects, and none can be evaluated
fully in this limited space. Instead, the paper uses selected examples ofWhy Have Separate Environmental Taxes?35
the trade-offs among these three objectives. Section 2 discusses the de-
sign of environmental taxes generally, including the trade-off among
many possible objectives. Section 3 provides evidence on administrative
costs and estimates some compliance costs. Section 4 reviews the effects
of some actual U.S. environmental taxes, and Section 5 presents a case
study of an incentive-based tax that failed. Finally, Section 6 presents an
inputoutput model and uses it to estimate the shifting of U.S. environ-
mental tax burdens from taxed industries to other industries.
Any generalization might be considered adventurous, since each U.S.
tax has somewhat different effects on incentives, burdens, and compli-
ance costs. Nevertheless, three conclusions emerge from this analysis.
First, in general, U.S. policy has not used "environmental taxes" for incen-
tives to discourage pollution. The United States has no tax on vehicle
emissions, no tax on smokestack emissions, and no tax on the generation
or disposal of waste. Instead, actual policy has put great weight on the
second objectiveto collect from those responsible for pollution. Con-
gress seems concerned not with incentives for future behavior, but with
funding the cleaning up of past pollution at existing toxic waste sites, oil
spills, and leaky underground storage tanks. The U.S. imposes "environ-
mental" taxes on chemicals, petroleum, and other inputs to production.
These taxes may collect from the industries responsible for contaminated
sites, and they finance various trust funds for the cleanup of those sites,
but they do not discourage behavior that leads to contamination or spills.
To put the point more strongly, these taxes apply to goods that are useful
in production rather than to "bads" such as pollution. They may well
distort incentives away from efficient methods of production rather than
improve incentives by discouraging pollution.
Second, these taxes raise the cost of production and thus raise equilib-
rium output prices. An incentive-based tax on smokestack emissions
would raise the cost of producing certain goods, but then those goods
are used as inputs to the production of other goods. The ultimate burden
becomes diffuse. Similarly, actual U.S. taxes apply to goods like chemi-
cals, petroleum, and coal that are inputs to virtually all other industries.
The calculations presented in this paper use an inputoutput model to
find the effect of actual environmental taxes on 41 output prices. Taxes
apply to 9 of the intermediate inputs, at rates up to 7 percent, but they
raise the cost of production for all 41 outputs. Most prices rise by less
than 1 percent, and the largest increase is 2 percent. Thus, the ultimate
burdens are similar to those of a broad-based tax. Separate environmen-
tal taxes are not effective at targeting burdens on those responsible for
pollution, except to the extent that all of us are responsible. The objec-
tive of fairness may be equally met by broad-based taxes.36Fullerton
Third, the evidence on administrative and compliance costs strongly
suggests economies of scale in the collection of revenue. Each tax re-
quires its own set of forms, its own administrative structure, and its own
calculation of the tax base for each taxpayer. Those calculations are the
same whether the tax base is multiplied by a low tax rate or a high tax
rate. Thus, the compliance cost as a fraction of revenue will tend to be
high at tax rates that are low. Yet each separate environmental tax in the
United States collects revenue for a separate cleanup program that repre-
sents a very small fraction of the total federal budget. Each rate of tax is
typically less than 1 percent. Thus, these taxes have a relatively high
compliance cost per dollar of revenue.
When the three pieces of this puzzle come together, an interesting
pattern emerges. A separate environmental tax might be effective at
discouraging a particular polluting activity, even if it requires its own
administrative structure and has a relatively high compliance cost per
dollar of revenue. But actual environmental taxes do not follow that
logic. Separate environmental taxes are used not for incentives but to
target burdens on particular industries thought to be responsible. Each
tax funds the cleanup of a particular pollution problem, applies at a low
rate, and has a relatively high compliance cost. But burdens cannot be
targeted. The same revenue could be collected, with the same diffuse
burdens, using an existing broad-based tax instrument with a much
lower compliance cost per dollar of revenue. The analysis points toward
better use of incentive-based environmental taxes or the funding of
cleanup programs using general revenues.
2. THE DESIGN OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
Policymakers are torn by trade-offs among competing policy objectives.
This section briefly describes at least a dozen such objectives, whereas
the rest of the paper concentrates on the first three. First, a tax can be
used to increase economic efficiency by discouraging an activity that
causes environmental harm. In theory, the total welfare of society is
maximized by continuing a production activity until social marginal bene-
fit falls to the level of social marginal cost. If some pollutant generates
external costs not recognized by the firm, then the activity may continue
beyond that point, until marginal benefit falls to the level of purely
private marginal cost. This behavior can be restrained either by tradi-
tional command and control regulations that tell the firm to cut back, or
by incentive-based policies that induce the firm to cut back. As sug-
gested by Pigou (1932), a tax on emissions can make the firm recognize
the full social cost of its actions. Ideally, the Pigouvian tax would applyWhy Have Separate Environmental Taxes?37
not to the output of the industry but to the part of the production
process that causes the pollution. For example, a tax on hazardous waste
would provide incentives to change not just the input of chemicals, but
the nature of their use and the generation of hazardous waste by-
products. Such taxes raise the cost of production, and higher prices
might discourage purchase of the output, but they also provide incen-
tives for the firm to reduce the pollution per unit of output. Such taxes
might improve on command and control regulations by inducing firms
to find the minimum cost method of controlling waste emissions: each
firm can decide whether it is cheaper to scrap the old process for a new
technology, switch inputs, buy control equipment, or pay the tax.
Thus, the "polluter pays" can be interpreted as a principle of economic
efficiency, where the objective of the tax is to collect a marginal price per
unit of pollution. But it can also be interpreted as a principle of fairness,
where the objective of the tax is to collect appropriate total amounts from
the parties responsible for the pollution. A tax might be used to achieve
this second objective without the first. An example is the U.S. tax on
chemical feedstocks (intermediate inputs). This tax is devoted to the
cleanup of abandoned contaminated sites under the Superfund pro-
gram, and it may well collect from the firms responsible for that pollu-
tion. But this tax on the input of chemicals does not provide incentives to
change the use of those chemicals, reduce the generation of waste, or
dispose of that waste safely. It does not discourage the abandonment of
contaminated sites.
The goal of fairness might also involve distributional effects more
generally, including the ultimate burdens of the tax on different income
groups.
A third goal is to minimize administrative costs to government and
compliance costs to taxpayers. Increased complexity usually requires
more instructions, more time filling out forms, and more difficult audits.
Yet some complexity might be necessary to identify particular polluting
activities. A tax on hazardous waste would better discourage polluting
behavior, but taxes on chemical feedstocks and petroleum are probably
easier to administer and still collect from the waste-generating firms.
Another complication is that the administrative cost of using taxes to
protect the environment really should be compared with the analogous
administrative costs of using alternative command and control policies
to regulate polluting behavior.
Some other objectives should at least be mentioned.1 A fourth goal is
1A large literature discusses the choice among policy options: see Bohm and Russell
(1985), Baumol and Oates (1988), Merrill and Rousso (1991), or Barthold (1994).38Fullerton
to avoid problems of information and measurement. The idealincentive-
based tax rate would reflect the marginal external cost of pollution, but
this cost is difficult to measure, since it may require the probablenumber
and cost of illnesses, the dollar value of lives lost, and the aggregate
willingness to pay for greater visibility. Yet actual environmental tax
rates are not set on this basis at all. Each tax is set instead at a ratethat
will yield a prespecified revenue for a trust fund. For example, Su-
perfund taxes pay for the costs of cleaning up existing contaminated
sites, costs that bear no relation to the external cost of using more new
chemicals or petroleum.
A fifth goal is the flexibility to adjust tax rules as information and
measurement improve or as the situation changes. On the other hand, a
sixth goal is to provide business with a more certain set of tax rates so as
not to change the rules in the middle of the game. Seventh,the policy
needs to reflect monitoring capabilities. A Pigouvian tax may require
counting tons of emissions, whereas a design standard simply requires
authorities to confirm the use of a particular kind of pollution control
equipment. An eighth goal is political feasibility. A regulation can "guar-
antee" certain pollution controls, whereas a tax must rely on the theory
that firms will be induced to cut pollution. Also, existing firms may
provide more support for a plan to allocate tradable permits than for a
plan to tax all emissions. A ninth, related objective involves ethics. One
view is that pollution is a "crime against nature" that ought to be stigma-
tized by legal regulations rather than condoned by the mere payment of
a tax. Tenth, policymakers must worryabout the costs of a transition to a
new system of taxation, includingunemployment, moving costs, and
retraining. Yet another objective is to account for methods of avoidance
or evasion. A tax applied to each unitof waste brought to a qualified
disposal facility might be designed to reflect the social harm from that
waste and to discourage generation of waste, but it might just shift
disposal away from the qualified facilities and toward improper methods
of disposal that can cause worse environmental harm.2 Finally, the imple-
mentation of a Pigouvian tax might be complicated by the concern for
other policy goals related to issues, such as market structure, monopoly
power, trade agreements, and international competitiveness.
No tax can meet all twelve of these objectives. It might be possible to
identify certain reforms, however, that can achieve more of one objective
without significant losses elsewhere. In particular, since existing U.S.
2In some cases, evasion is easy. A tanker truck filled with waste can enter a truck wash,
get all the washer sprays going, and then open the drain on the bottom of the truck.
Another example is that waste oil can easily go undetected if dumped on roadbeds of
railroad lines.Why Have Separate Environmental Taxes?39
environmental taxes are not designed for incentives anyway, an alterna-
tive broad-based tax may have the same diffuse burdens with less com-
pliance cost.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMPLIANCE COST
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) budget is about $6 billion per year,
which includes spending on equipment and rent as well as salaries of
clerks, auditors, and lawyers. This administrative cost is less than 0.6
percent of total federal receipts ($1.09 trillion in 1992). Thus, the U.S. is
fairly efficient at collecting taxes. The IRS cannot break down their costs
of collecting each tax.
The reason that the U.S. government has relatively low collection
costs is that it puts most of the cost on the taxpayers. The compliance
cost to taxpayers includes not only the dollars paid to accountants and
lawyers, but the value of all time spent keeping receipts, reading instruc-
tions, and filling out forms. For the individual income tax, Slemrod and
Sorum (1984) estimate for 1982 that "between 1.8 and 2.1 billion hours of
taxpayer time were spent on filing tax returns, and between $3.0 and
$3.4 billion was spent on professional tax assistance." Taxpayer time is
valued at the net wage rate for a total compliance cost of 5 to 7 percent of
revenue. Thus, the compliance cost of the income tax is ten times the
administrative cost to the IRS.
3.1 Economies of Scale
Both logic and evidence suggest that many of these administrative and
compliance costs are "fixed" costs of calculating the tax base, not mar-
ginal costs of collecting more revenue by raising the rate of tax on a given
tax base. Compliance costs depend on the complexity and number of
forms to be filed by taxpayers, just as administrative costs depend on the
number of forms to be checked by the IRS. Under the income tax, differ-
ent forms are required for itemized deductions, depreciation calcula-
tions, and each type of income, such as interest, dividends, capital
gains, rental income, and self-employment income. The last step is to
multiply this tax base times a tax rate, or just look up the tax in a table
provided by the IRS, a step that is equally simple whether that tax rate is
1 or 30 percent. Thus, the technology of tax collections exhibits econo-
mies of scale. The administrative cost or compliance cost as a fraction of
tax revenue is expected to fall as the tax rate and revenue becomes
larger.
The same economies hold for excise taxes. When the United Kingdom
increased the value-added tax (VAT) rate from 8 to 15 percent in 1979,40Fullerton
for example, Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989) foundthat "over
the next few years the [administrative] cost : revenue ratio in thecollec-
tion of the VAT fell from 2 percent to one percent mainly,though not
solely, because of the increase in rate" (p. 20).
Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989) find further evidence of
economies of scale by looking at firms of different sizes. For 1986-1987in
the United Kingdom, the cost of complying with the VAT as a percentof
the tax base was smaller for businesses that were larger, asmeasured
either by the tax base or by the number of employees (p. 142).Similar
results were found for the goods and services tax (GST) in Canadaby
Plamondon and Associates, Inc. (1993) and for the corporation income
tax in the United States by Slemrod and Blumenthal(1993). Although
this type of scale economy pertains to firm size rather than tax rate,the
implication still is that compliance cost includes a fixed annual amount
that depends on the number and complexity of forms used tocalculate
the tax base.
If the only goal were to raise a small additional amount of revenuefor
a trust fund, this analysis suggests asmall increase in a preexisting
excise tax rate, corporate income tax rate, or even personal income tax
rates. If a special tax must be introduced, the revenuewould be collected
most efficiently with a single tax rate on a relatively simple taxbase.
3.2 An Estimate of Compliance Cost for the Corporate
Environmental Tax
The Superfund's corporate environmental tax (CET) is not an excise tax
at all. It applies at a 0.12 percent rate on a measureof income that is
related to the alternative minimum tax (AMT), regardless ofwhether
that firm is actually subject to the AMT.4 Revenue is about a half abillion
dollars, but compliance is complicated.
To calculate the AMT, the firm starts with its regular taxable income
and adds back net operating loss deductions, "adjustments," and "pref-
erence" items, such as interest from certain tax-exempt bonds. The"ad-
justments" include the difference between depreciation according to
regular tax schedules and depreciation according to AMT rules. Thus,
Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) say that their "tables 10 through 15 suggest that, in
general, compliance costs rise less than proportionately with firm size, so that average
costs per unit of size, however measured, are lower for larger firms. ... The findings of
economies of scale in tax compliance costs is common in studies across countries and
across types of tax" (p. 6).
The AMT was created in 1986 to ensure that taxpayers with substantial incomescould not
avoid paying taxes through "excessive" use of deductions, tax credits, and other exclusions
permitted under the law.Why Have Separate Environmental Taxes?41
for each asset it purchases, the firm must keep track of one depreciation
schedule for book purposes, another for the regular tax, and a third for
the AMT. Also, deductions are cut back for mining costs, intangible
drilling costs, and pollution control facilities (see Lyon, 1991,pp. 51-82).
Then the AMT requires an additional calculation of profits, termed ad-
justed current earnings (ACE).
The firm calculates regular tax as 35 percent of corporate taxable in-
come, and then it calculates the tentative minimum tax as 20 percent of
AMT income (AMTI), a broader definition of income. It pays AMT equal
to the excess of tentative minimum tax over regular tax, if any.
Regardless of whether the firm pays the AMT, the CET applies at a
0.12 percent rate to the "modified" AMTI in excess of $2 million, where
the AMTI is modified to disallow deductions for net operating losses and
for the CET itself.
If all firms had to calculate the AMTI anyway, then the CET would
not introduce much additional compliance cost. Of the 12,199 firms that
paid the CET in 1990, however, 8,584 (70 percent) did not pay the
AMT.5 The additional costs to these firms of complying with the CET
can be substantial, if they are anything like the cost of complying with
the AMT estimated by Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993). They surveyed
365 large corporations and found that their average cost of corporate
income tax compliance was $1.57 million (p. 5). Using the 365 observa-
tions, they regressed compliance cost on certain firm characteristics and
found that
Being subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT) adds 16.9 percent; this is
true even though all but three of the firms report that they must calculate the
alternative minimum tax liability. This result implies that those firms that sus-
pect that they will actually have AMT liability devote more resources to its
calculation and planning implications [pp. 7-81.
In other words, almost all firms make initial calculations to determine
whether they are subject to the AMT, but the extra 16.9 percent of
compliance cost is incurred only by firms that really are subject to AMT.
Presumably they review calculations carefully and undertake more tax
planning.6 This additional compliance cost is 16.9 percent of $1.57 mil-
lion, or $265,330 per firm. This figure is used by Probst et al. (1995) to
provide a rough estimate of CET compliance costs.
Phone conversation with Patty Treubert, IRS, Statistics of Income Division, May 1994.
6The regression results may also reflect greater complexity of firms that pay the AMT.42Fullerton
First, however, consider the Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993)esti-
mates. The $1.57 million of compliance cost seemslarge, but they look
only at very large firms. In fact, 98 of their 365 firms are inthe Fortune
500 largest industrial firms in the United States. Forthese large firms,
the estimated compliance cost is a reasonable 3 percentof total taxes
paid. Second, Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) find that AMTcalcula-
tions cost 17 percent more. This figure seems low,if anything, since the
AMT is a parallel tax system that essentiallydoubles the number of
calculations necessary to obtain taxable income, allowabledeductions,
and tax due. Thus, the $265,330 is a very believable cost of AMTcompli-
ance for these firms.
Third, consider what the cost of AMT compliance indicates about the
cost of CET compliance. All large firms performrough calculations to
determine AMT liability, so the $265,330 represents the incremental cost
of actually having to pay the AMT. The same increment would represent
the cost of having to pay the CET if the calculations areperformed
properly, since the same tax base is used for both. On the otherhand,
compliance costs include tax planning costs, which may increasewith
the tax rate. In other words, firms may expend more effort toreduce the
AMT at the 20 percent rate than to reduce the CET at the 0.12percent
rate.
Fourth, consider whether the firms studied by Slemrod and Blumen-
thal (1993) are representative of firms that pay the CET. The firms sur-
veyed are large, but so are the firms that pay the CET, since the CET
applies only to the extent that the AMTI exceeds 2 million dollars. Of 3.7
million corporate tax returns in 1990, the IRS reports that only 5,589 (0.15
percent) are what they call giants, firms with more than $250 millionof
assets. Of 32,462 firms that pay the AMT, however,1,324 (4 percent) are
"giants." Even more striking is that 3,131 of the 12,199 firms that paythe
CETa full 25 percentare giants.7
Finally, consider which of these firms could be said to incur the extra
$265,330 compliance cost. Of the 8,584 firms that pay the CET but not the
AMT, the IRS reports that 1,952 (23 percent) are giants. If the $265,330
cost applies only to these 1,952 "giants" that paythe CET and not the
AMT, the compliance cost would be $518 million. This compliance cost is
100 percent of total CET revenue.8 This estimate is meant to be conserva-
These figures were all reported in a phone conversation by Patty Treubert,IRS, Statistics
of Income Division, May 1994.
8Others have suggested that "the cost of computing the CET could be greaterthan the
current tax liability" for some companies (see Price Waterhouse, 1992, p.47.).Why Have Separate Environmental Taxes?43
tive, since it totally ignores the compliance cost for the (12,199- 1,952
=) 10,247 firms that are not giants or that already pay the AMT.9
Even this estimate may seem implausibly large, but note that the
$265,330 compliance cost represents only the annual cost of one accoun-
tant and one tax lawyer, a moderate allocation of personnel for one of
these giant corporations. This cost is attributed only to the largest 1,952
of the 12,199 firms that pay the CETs. Instead, the same total estimated
compliance cost ($518 million) can be expressed as an average of $42,462
for all of the 12,199 firms that pay the CET. The problem is not that this
compliance cost is so large, but that the revenue is so small, also only
$42,462 per firm. 10
The CET was not designed to discourage polluting activities nor to
target its burden on those responsible. Rather, it was intended to raise
some money for the cleanup of contaminated sites under the Superfund.
But an additional collection mechanism is not necessary to raise some
money for cleanup.
4. SOME ACTUAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES
The IRS Statistics of Income identifies four "environmental" taxes on (1)
petroleum, for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and the Su-
perfund; (2) chemical feedstocks, for the Superfund; (3) ozone-depleting
chemicals, for the general fund; and (4) motor fuels, for the Leaky Under-
ground Storage Tank (LUST) fund.'1 Table 1 summarizes the rates and
revenues from some components of these explicitly environmental
taxes. Each is discussed further later. Table 1 also summarizes some
other federal excise taxes that are likely to have environmental effects,
such as taxes on coal, tires, gasoline, trucks and trailers, gas guzzlers,
and transportation. These taxes probably discourage the use of fossil
fuels that cause air pollution and global warming, but they are not la-
beled as environmental taxes because they do not feed a trust fund used
to clean up the environment.
The firms studied by Slemrod and Blumenthal (1993) may be even larger, on average,
than these 1,952 giants. Microdata are not available to make use of the estimated coefficient
on size. The $265,330 estimate may be a bit high even for these 1,952 firms, but this bias is
probably more than offset by ignoring the compliance cost of the other 10,247 firms that
pay the CET.
10The CET is complex, but at least it uses the existing definition of the AMTI. Some
proposed alternatives would have invented a whole new tax base.
11The IRS lists many excise taxes that might affect the environment, like the gasoline tax
for the Highway Trust Fund, but the category for "environmental" excise taxes includes


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This is only a partial list. Barthold (1994) provides auseful table of 51
federal tax code provisions that might affect the environment,including
other excise taxes as well as federal income tax provisions,such as cred-
its for nonconventional fuels, reforestation,and closed-loop biomass
production. The income tax also affects the environmentthrough its
treatment of commuting expenses, depletion allowances,intangible drill-
ing expenses, mine exploration expenses,pollution control equipment,
and capital gains from timber sales
12Analysis here is limited to the
excise taxes listed in Table 1.
4.1 Petroleum Tax
An oil refiner is required to pay tax when domesticcrude petroleum is
received at a U.S. refinery, and an importer must pay taxwhen crude oil
and refined petroleum products enter the United States.Table 1 shows
that in 1992 the OSLTF received 5 cents perbarrel, and the Hazardous
Substance Superfund received 9.7 cents perbarrel, so the combined tax
on crude petroleum was 14.7cents per barrel. At a price of about $20 per
barrel, crude oil was effectively taxed at a rate of about0.7 or 0.8 percent.
The combined tax collected $827 million in 1992,which is only 0.076
percent of federal receipts ($1.09 trillion in 1992).
13
This tax is small, but its operation is simple.Table 1 shows that it
applies to only 341 firms. The last columndivides tax revenue by the
number of taxpaying firms, as a very rough indicatorof compliance cost
efficiency. For the Superfund tax on petroleum,the compliance cost per
firm must be much less than the average revenueof $1.6 million per
firm.
The revenue is used to clean up toxic waste, and Congressattempted
to target the burden on those responsible.For the initial legislation in
1980, a survey of the chemical composition ofhazardous waste sites was
used to determine that 15 percent was derivedfrom petroleum, 65 per-
cent from petrochemicals, and 20 percentfrom inorganic substances.
The total revenue requirement was divided inthese proportions, and
12Barthold (1994) also describes several reasons for separateenvironmental taxes. First, a
Pigouvian tax would discourage pollution. Second, the benefitprinciple suggests a "user
fee," or tax that reflects benefits from using a public environmental resource.Third, a tax
can represent a mandated "insurance premium"for risk pooling, such as the tax on
petroleum that is used to clean up oil spills. A problem is that oilcompanies cannot draw
on this fund in case of accident; it isonly for costs that cannot be recovered from liable
firms.
13The oil spill portion of the tax was suspended on July 1, 1993(because the trust fund
achieved its target of $1 billion), and it expired on December 31, 1994.The remaining 9.7
cent Superfund tax represents less than one half of 1 percentof the petroleum price.Why Have Separate Environmental Taxes?47
then the projected size of each tax base was used to determine thetax
rate that would collect the desired revenue from each source.14
This rationale has a number of problems. First, even if this tax applies
to the responsible firms, it cannot apply to the managersor shareholders
responsible for this past pollution because those individuals have long
since changed jobs or sold their stock in the company. The burden of the
tax could at best apply to new managers and shareholders who had
nothing to do with the existing abandoned contaminated sites. Second,
even if the legislated burdens on these firms are passed on to customers
through higher prices, the customers may not be thesame individuals
who benefited from artificially low prices in the past. Third, thetax does
nothing to discourage the abandonment of contaminated sites. It applies
to petroleum as an input to production, not to any waste by-product that
gives rise to external cost. Other environmental regulationsare designed
to control the handling of waste from productionprocesses that use
petroleum. Similarly, as noted by Barthold(1994),the OSLTF tax on
petroleum did not apply to oil spills or to behavior that mightcause
spills. It applied at the same rate to all oil, whether transported by
pipeline, in single-hulled tankers, or in double-hulled tankers thatare
more difficult to rupture.
The petroleum tax might have some incentive effects thatare favorable
to the environment if it discourages the use of petroleum that iscorre-
lated to the burning of petroleum-based fuelsor the runoff from
petroleum-based fertilizers. But these goals could be better achieved by
taxes on the appropriate fuels and fertilizers, if not directlyon the emis-
sions and runoff.
4.2 Chemical Feedstock Taxes
Another federal excise tax is imposed on the sale oruse of42organic
and inorganic chemical feedstocks (intermediate inputs), whetherdo-
mestic or imported. The revenue is devoted to the Superfund. Thetax
rates were originally set in1980at$4.87per ton for organic chemicals
and at similar rates per ton for inorganic chemicals.15 Since then,indi-
vidual rates have been modified. Whereas the petroleumtax collected
$553million with a single rate on one commodity, Table 1 showsthat
the chemical feedstock taxes collected$252million using42rates on42
"See the July 11, 1980, report of the Senate Committee on Environment andPublic
Works, regarding 5. 1480, as described in Price Waterhouse (1992) Appendix A,note 23.
15Inorganic chemicals are taxed at $0.17 per ton plus $4.28 per ton times the portionof
molecular weight deemed to be attributable to hazardous elements. The totaltax rate was
limited to 2 percent of the wholesale price in 1980 (see Price Waterhouse, 1992,Appendix A).48Fullerton
different commodities.16 The complications areillustrated by the fact
that a different set of chemicals is exemptunder each of the following
circumstances: if used in the manufactureof certain motor fuels; if used
in making certain fertilizer; if produced as aby-product of air pollution
control devices; if existing only temporarily in thesmelting or refining
of nontaxed chemicals; if coal-derivedfeedstocks; if a separated isomer
of xylene; if recovered from certain recycling processes;if used to pro-
duce a qualified animal feed substance; if partof an intermediate hydro-
carbon stream; or if exported (Commerce ClearingHouse, 1995, pp.
210-213).
In 1986, to avoid putting domestic producers at acompetitive disad-
vantage, Congress added taxes on the importof 50 chemical substances
produced using chemical feedstocks that are taxed in theUnited States.
The rate on each of these substances is meant toreflect the tax that
would have been paid on the chemical feedstocks used in itsproduction.
This law also directs the Secretary of the Treasury toaugment this list
with additional substances demonstrated to contain taxedchemicals that
constitute 50 percent of the product by weight or byvalue. Since that
time, at least 77 additional imported chemicalsubstances have been
added to the list. Despite imposing 127 different tax rates on127 differ-
ent imported chemical substances, these taxestogether collected only
$16.5 million in 1992, as shown in Table 1. Thisamount is about 1
percent of the total Superfund tax, whichitself is about 0.1 percent of
total federal revenue.
If this tax had any benefit in terms of revenue or competitiveness,that
benefit is swamped by administrative complexity. Becausethe chemical
feedstock tax does not apply to exports, the IRS mustestablish proce-
dures to refund the right amount of tax on an exportproduced using the
taxed input. Then the IRS must continually consider petitionsto add to
the list, from exporters who want refunds and fromothers who want
taxes on imported goods with which they compete.
The original motivation for these taxes was related toSuperfund sites
contaminated not by these chemicals themselves, but bytoxic waste by-
products that were generated by the use of thesechemicals in complex
16Several of the 42 rates are the same. All excise taxes appear on IRS Form720, with one
set of instructions and one line for "chemicals," but theindividual chemicals are listed on
Form 6627 for "environmental taxes." A firm that must pay tax on twoof these commodi-
ties clearly incurs less than twice the compliance cost of afirm that must pay tax on one.
The main problem with taxing any additional commodity is that it mayincrease the num-
ber of firms that must file the forms. The IRS estimates the averagefirm's time require-
ments for recordkeeping at twenty-five hours, twenty-oneminutes, learning about the
forms at two hours, twenty-six minutes, and preparing forms ateight hours, fifty-two
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compound forms (Fullerton and Tsang, 1993). Toxicity depends on what
the firms do with the chemicals.
4.3 Ozone-Depleting Chemicals
The Montreal Protocol is an international agreement to phase out the use
of halons and chiorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that deplete the layer of strato-
spheric ozone protecting the Earth from the harmful ultraviolet rays of
the sun. Halons are used in fire extinguishers and CFCs in air condition-
ers. The agreement sets phased quantity restrictions and lets individual
nations decide how to meet them. The U.S. uses a combination of quan-
tity regulations and taxes. The tax rate on each chemical is determined
by a base tax amount (which started at $1.37 per pound in 1989) times an
"ozone-depleting factor" (which was set at 1.0 for CFC-12 and which
varies from 0.1 for methyl chloroform to 10.0 for halon-1301). The num-
ber of taxed chemicals has grown to 20, and the initial base tax amount
has grown to $5.35 per pound in 1995. It will increase by another $0.45
per pound every year.
This tax is not retrospective like other environmental taxes that fi-
nance a cleanup fund by collecting from those responsible for some past
pollution problem. This tax does not feed a trust fund. It is prospective,
since it helps prevent further harm by reducing the future use of ozone-
depleting chemicals. It applies fairly closely to the activity causing envi-
ronmental harm, and it even applies at a rate that varies with the degree
of environmental harm.
Yet Congress did not intend to use incentives for the environment.
Instead, quantity restrictions on manufacturers were designed to meet
the quantity targets in the Montreal Protocol. Congress then noticed that
quantity restrictions can lead to monopoly profits. The tax rate was set
equal to the expected difference between the new equilibrium price and
the cost of production (Merrill and Rousso, 1991). In other words, this
tax was enacted as a windfall profits tax rather than as a Pigouvian tax.
Congress was concerned with fairness and revenue, not incentives.
Producers reacted by cutting production below the levels mandated
by the Montreal Protocol. 17 Since the quantity restriction is not binding,
the tax unintentionally became the operational tool for reducing use of
ozone-depleting chemicals.18
17Barthold (1994) considers the case of ozone-depleting chemicals in great detail. He
points out that the quantity control could be viewed as a "backstop that is reassuring to
those who doubt the efficacy of the price system" (p. 135).
18Other aspects of the tax are not ideal for incentives. As just described, the tax rate was
not set by looking at the environmental damage per unit of chemical. Also, the tax applies
to production and use of these chemicals, whereas environmental damage occurs only on50Fullerton
Any time that a tax is imposed on a particular commodity, or in this
case twenty, Congress has to worry about several issuesthat complicate
the operation of the tax. First, rules and exemptions must be specified
for each chemical. Second, the tax is imposed on manufacturers rather
than the more numerous purchasers of these chemicals; but then the
imposition of the tax can be avoided by selling off inventories in anticipa-
tion of the effective date. To prevent this transitional problem, Congress
often imposes a special tax on floor stocks held by purchasers on the
date that such a tax is enacted or increased. Table 1 shows that the tax on
floor stocks of ozone-depleting chemicals raised only $9.9 million in 1992
but applied to 1,440 firms, so the average is only $6,900 per taxpayer.'9
The tax on floor stocks is shown for ozone-depleting chemicals only in
Table 1, but similar rules have applied to the imposition of taxes on
virtually any type of commodity.
Third, Congress is concerned with international competitiveness and
feels compelled to tax each import at a rate that reflects the tax that
would have been paid on the input to its production if it had been
produced in the United States (Davie, 1995). The Superfund tax on im-
ported chemical substances was described earlier, but a similar logic
applies to ozone-depleting chemicals. Poterba and Rotemberg (1995) ana-
lyze the logic of this extra corrective tax and show that it is impossible to
implement it in the common case where final goods are produced as
joint products. The point here is that even if imperfect rules areimple-
mented, using arbitrary assumptions about foreign production, they are
bound to be complicated.
Finally, some of these complications can be avoided by ignoring small
amounts, but Congress prohibited the Treasury from creating de ininimus
exemptions for electronics (Barthold, 1994). Thus, the tax on importof
goods produced using ozone-depleting chemicals is most often below 1
percent and is only 0.03 percent for fax machines, camcorders,and ra-
dios (Davie, 1995).
4.4 Motor Fuels
The fourth and final explicit environmental tax is a tiny $0.001 per gallon
tax on gasoline and other motor fuels that finances the trustfund used to
their release into the atmosphere (Barthold, 1994). Halons are never released fromfire
extinguishers that are never used, and CFCs are not released from air conditioners if the
CFCs are properly recaptured for later use. For this reason, Bohm (1981) has suggestedthe
use of a depositrefund system that would rebate the tax onCFCs that are captured and
returned.
19Although their own revenue is small, floor stock taxes may prevent the loss of excise tax
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clean up leaky underground storage tanks for which no solvent owner
can be found. Fortunately, this small tax is attached to other more sub-
stantial taxes on gasoline and other motor fuels. The overall tax rate on
gasoline is now $. 184 per gallon, and the rate on diesel fuel is $.244 per
gallon. Substitute fuels such as gasohol are taxed at lower rates to encour-
age conservation of fossil fuels.
The gasoline tax is about the best available example of an incentive-
based environmental tax (even though it is not called an environmental
tax because it does not finance a cleanup program). Gasoline is a well-
defined commodity to tax, and the revenue is substantial. This tax col-
lected almost $15 billion in 1992, as shown in Table 1. It has incentive
effects favorable to the environment, since it might help to conserve
energy and improve air quality.
It is still a highly imperfect example, however. Its original intent was
not as an incentive-based tax, but as a user fee to collect from those who
benefit from public spending on highways. Most of it still finances the
Highway Trust Fund, used for highway construction. Its incentives are
weaker than one might think. Environmental damages result from emis-
sions, and gasoline is only weakly correlated to emissions. Walls and
Hanson (1995) describe how emission rates vary greatly across vehicle
age, vehicle maintenance, and styles of driving. In a study of a scrap-
page program, Alberini et al. (1994) find that pre-1980 vehicles currently
have an average tailpipe hydrocarbon emission rate (6.6 grams per mile)
that is 26 times the current new car standard (0.25 grams per mile). Even
a relatively new car might have many times its original emission rate if
its pollution control equipment is broken. Because of emissions from
cold start-ups, Burmich (1989) finds that a 5-mile trip has almost three
times the emissions per mile as a 20-mile trip at the same speed. Sierra
Research (1994) finds that a car driven aggressively has a carbon monox-
ide emission rate (39 grams per mile) that is almost 20 times higher than
when driven normally (2.2 grams per mile). The gasoline tax does not
have incentives to scrap high-emission cars, fix broken emission equip-
ment, or drive less aggressively.
Finally, some peculiar exemptions add considerable unnecessary com-
plexity. Since it is a fee on users of highways, the special motor fuels tax
(even the LUST portion) does not apply to "off-highway business use,"
such as fisheries and whaling businesses, but "off-highway use" does
not include motorboats or diesel-powered trains; use in farming; sales to
museums that operate exclusively for the care of World War II aircraft;
sales to state and local governments and to Indian tribal governments;
certain diplomatic uses; sales to nonprofit educational institutions; and
use of a helicopter for the exploration or development of minerals, oil, or52Fullerton
gas, or in logging operations or emergency medicalservices, unless the
helicopter takes off or lands at an airport eligible for federal assistance
(Commerce Clearing House, 1995, pp. 50-53). These exemptions are
designed to target burdens, not environmental incentives.
4.5 Other Implicit Environmental Taxes
Besides those four explicit environmental taxes, Table 1 lists a number of
other taxes likely to have environmental effects. These taxes mightfeed a
trust fund (but not for a cleanup program like the explicitenvironmental
taxes). The tax rates on coal in 1995 are the same as those in 1992, as
shown in Table 1, when the combined revenue was $630 million(0.06
percent of total federal receipts). This tax might discourage some useof
fossil fuels, but it was designed to place a burden on those who benefit
from the use of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund.
The small ($43 million per year) tax on pistols and revolvers might be
called environmental, since it feeds the Wildlife Restoration Account,
but it was designed as a user fee on those who benefit from that account.
To the extent that it discourages the use of guns, it might besaid to
correct a negative externality. The tax code includes a plethoraof other
excise taxes that might discourage driving and other use offossil fuels,
such as taxes on tires, on heavy trucks and trailers, on air transportation
of persons and property, and on vehicles shown to have low mileage per
gallon ("gas guzzlers"). A few of these taxes are listed in Table 1.Section
6 considers whether the many separate taxes have any separateeffects
on tax burdens.
5. A CASE STUDY OF AN INCENTIVE-BASED TAX
THAT FAILED
The incentive-based tax inevitably conflicts with other goals of policy-
makers. Consider a waste-end tax. First, the waste reduction itself con-
flicts with the tax revenue goal, since it erodes the tax base and reduces
revenue. For this reason, waste reduction has mostoften been omitted
from any list of goals for actual waste-end taxes in the past.
Second, the waste-end tax may conflict with the goal of fairness if it is
used to clean up an existing contaminated site, since it collects from
generators of new waste and from those who use proper(taxable) dis-
posal methods, not from those who generated the past waste that was
improperly handled at the existing contaminated site.
Third, a waste-end tax may conflict with the goal of minimizing admin-
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data on the number of hazardous waste generators or the amount of
each type of waste generated.2° It may be difficult to administer and to
enforce because of easy opportunities for avoidance. Firms may use
cheap on-site disposal methods that are hard to capture within the pur-
view of the tax, and they might use other, outright illegal methods, such
as midnight dumping. The usual tax administration and compliance cost
is augmented by significant noncompliance costs.2'
Consider the reasoning behind the federal waste-end tax originally
enacted in 1980 and behind its repeal in 1986.The 1980 legislation not
only established the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund (later
known as the Superfund) to deal with contaminated sites, but it also
established the Post-Closure Liability Trust Fund (PCLTF) to ensure con-
tinued long-term monitoring and care at other closed hazardous waste
disposal facilities. To qualify for this program, a facility must receive a
permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
operate in compliance with the RCRA, continue monitoring for 5 years
after closing, and demonstrate no substantial likelihood of any future
release of hazardous substances. After the 5-year period, the federal
government would assume any future liability (including third-party
claims, not covered under the Superfund). The PCLTF was financed by a
tax on hazardous waste that would remain at qualified facilities, at a rate
of $2.13 per dry-weight ton. This tax would not be imposed during any
year in which the balance in the fund exceeded $200 million.
The PCLTF was intended to encourage firms to comply with the
RCRA and not to abandon sites on closure. The fund would help to
avoid future health hazards, increase the chances of detecting releases
promptly, and ensure that funds would be available to pay remaining
20See Carison and Bausell (1987). They also evaluate several waste-end tax options.
McNeil and Foshee (1988) compare a tax on waste disposal to a tax on waste generation.
21These noncompliance costs can be reduced by replacing the waste-end tax with a
"deposit-refund" system. Bohm (1981) and Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995) describe such a
system. First, it would collect tax on each firm's purchase of any substance that is poten-
tially polluting, at a rate that reflects the external cost of illegal disposal of that substance.
Second, it would then rebate those taxes according to the amounts of those substances that
exit the firm through sales of final products, leaving no tax on substances that do not
appear as waste. Third, it would rebate part of the original tax on any item that exits the
firm by qualified disposal methods. The part of the tax that is not rebated could reflect the
social external cost of disposal that takes place even by qualified methods at qualified sites.
The entire tax would remain on substances appearing neither in sales nor in qualified
disposal methodspresumably illegal disposal. Such systems may be difficult to imple-
ment, but they are not as difficult as taxing illegal disposal directly.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) was enacted in 1980 and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) in 1986.54Fullerton
claims (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 1985, P. 13). The
tax, of course, was intended to finance the fund. It follows the "polluter
pays" principle by collecting from firms that generate the wastes that
entail the risk of future health or property damage. Note, however, that
this list of goals omits any mention of using the tax to reduce the genera-
tion of such waste.
This fund and waste-end tax had a long list of problems that let to its
repeal. First, the legislation never defined a "dry-weight ton." Presum-
ably, the intent was to exclude the water component of different wastes in
order to make them comparable, but it certainly left an administrative
complexity. Second, the tax base excluded a lot of waste that is never sent
to a qualified facility but is instead managed on site.23 Third, the tax and
the fund applied to land-disposal facilities, such as a landfill or surface
impoundment. To the extent that the fund helped insure firms undertak-
ing land disposal, it conflicted with the stated goal of the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) of 1984 to minimize the disposal of
hazardous wastes in the land. Conversely, to the extent that the HSWA
discourages land disposal, it significantly reduces the revenue from this
tax on land disposal. Besides, incentives for care are adversely affected by
taking liability away from the original owner or operator of the facility.
Finally, the $200 million limit did not allow enough funds to cover
likely liability claims. The EPA (1985) estimated that the fund would
have less than a 10 percent chance of remaining in positive balance after
100 years. If the $200 million limit were removed, and if the rate were
increased over time to account for inflation, the fund would have a 90
percent chance of a positive balance after 100 years.
Faced with a revenue shortfall for a fund that contradicted a national
policy to discourage land disposal of hazardous waste, Congress in 1986
decided to repeal the PCLTF and to refund all amounts that had been
collected (see U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990).
6. THE SHIFTING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
TAX BURDENS
Congress can decide who is legally liable to pay a tax, but it cannot
legislate the ultimate distribution of burden. A tax on one good may
Environmental Information Ltd. (1993) estimates that 95 percent of hazardous waste-
generating firms rely on off-site facilities but that 95.4 percent of hazardous waste volumes
were managed on-site in 1989. The implication is that most of this volumeis wastewater of
relatively few large firms, managed on the premises, usually by deep-well injection,
whereas relatively many small firms generate small volumes of other hazardous waste that
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reverberate through the economy in such a way that other prices are
affected. An untaxed good may end up with a higher price, and anyone
who buys it bears a burden.24 This section describes calculations using
an inputoutput model that accounts for some of these indirect effects.
Since each industry purchases intermediate inputs that are produced by
every other industry, the cost of producing each output depends on the
gross-of-tax cost of buying all of its inputs. Section 6.1 describes the
model in general terms, and specific assumptions and equations can be
found in the Appendix. Section 6.2 calculates price changes attributable
to existing environmental taxes.
6.1 The InputOutput Model
Virtually all these environmental taxes apply to the purchase of an inter-
mediate input, such as chemical feedstocks or crude petroleum. Even
the tax on gasoline applies to purchases of gasoline by firms that pro-
duce other goods. The Superfund also imposes the CET on a measure of
corporate income, which is part of value added. All these taxes raise the
cost of production. In any particular industry, all firms are assumed to
face the same increase in cost. As these firms raise their own output
price, their customers may cut back on purchases. Some of these firms
may suffer losses in the short run and eventually must cut production or
exit the industry. After the dust settles, remaining firms can sell the
reduced output at a higher price that just covers the new higher cost of
production. Under competitive conditions, with constant returns to
scale, the output price rises by exactly the increase in cost.25 The remain-
ing empirical issue is to determine the extent to which each price rises,
that is, each industry's use of taxed inputs and of goods produced using
taxed inputs.
The U.S. Department of Commerce (1994, p. 73) provides exactly such
a matrix for 479 different industries.26 A column of this matrix shows, for
a particular industry, the amount of each of the 479 outputs that is used
as an input. For present purposes, however, fewer categories will suf-
fice. Table 2 shows how the 479 detailed industries are aggregated into
41 categories for this study. The number and name of each industry are
24 For a review of the literature on the ultimate distribution of tax burdens, see Kotlikoff
and Summers (1987).
The equilibrium price is also likely to rise in the case of imperfect competition but
perhaps not exactly by the amount of the tax (Katz and Rosen, 1985). A monopolist would
raise the price by less than the tax.
26 The most recent complete inputoutput data are for 1987, but these amounts are scaled
to 1990 for each industry using the ratio of gross domestic product in 1990 to that in 1987,
available in Yuskavage (1993).56Fullerton
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3.Metal mining 10 0.000.025 0.37
4.Coal mining 11-12 2.530.006 0.57





14 0.00 0.008 0.29
7.Construction 15-17 0.00 0.001 0.23
8.Food and kindred products 20 0.00 0.015 0.25
9.Tobacco manufacturers 21 0.00 0.056 0.13
10.Textile mill products 22 0.00 0.006 0.31
11.Apparel and other textile
products
23 0.00 0.006 0.18
12.Lumberandwoodproducts 24 0.00 0.011 0.27
(except next entry)
13.Wood preserving 2491 0.00 0.013 0.52
14.Furniture and fixtures 25 0.00 0.006 0.21
15.Paper and allied products 26 0.00 0.021 0.40
16.Printing and publishing 27 0.00 0.012 0.21
17.Inorganic chemicals (2812,
-16, -19, -73, -74, -79)
28 0.31 0.099 0.64
18.Organic chemicals (2813,
-65, -69)
28 0.98 0.029 0.66
19.Chemicals and allied prod-
ucts (except previous two
entries)
28 0.00 0.034 0.56
20.Petroleum refining 2911 6.94 0.151 1.08




30 0.31 0.004 0.40
23.Leather and leather products 31 0.00 0.015 0.25
24.Stone, clay, and glass
products
32 0.00 0.014 0.39
25.Primary metal industries 33 0.00 0.016 0.40
26.Fabricated metal products 34 0.03 0.008 0.24
27.Machinery, except electrical 35 0.00 0.018 0.18
28.Electrical and electronic
equipment
36 0.00 0.023 0.20
29.Motor vehicles and transpor-
tation equipment
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
Effective rate of tax on intermediate input of each good, calculated for 1990 as tax liability over the sum of
all its intermediate uses.
bEffective rate of Corporate Environmental Tax (CET) as a percent of the value added in each industry,
calculated for 1990 as CET liabilities over the value added.
listed in the first column, and the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
is shown in the second column. The aggregation basically represents the
two-digit SIC level, with some adjustments. Two-digit levels for most
manufacturing industries are retained (SIC 20-39), but wood preserving
is separated from other lumber and wood products (because wood pre-
serving is involved in a number of contaminated sites), and petroleum
refining is separated from other petroleum-related products. Chemicals
are divided into three categories that are taxed at different rates (taxed
organic chemicals, taxed inorganic chemicals, and untaxed chemicals).
Then nonmanufacturing industries are collapsed into fewer categories.
Just two industries are used to represent agriculture, and just one indus-
try is used for each of construction, transportation, wholesale trade,
retail trade, finance, and services.
The whole matrix is not shown here, but the data confirm general
expectations. The output of "crude petroleum and natural gas" (item 5 in
Table 2) is a major input to "petroleum refining" (item 20), whereas the
output of refined petroleum is a major input to "petroleum-related prod-
ucts" (item 21) and "transportation" (item 32). These petroleum products
















38 0.00 0.009 0.15
31.Miscellaneous manufacturing 39 0.00 0.016 0.23
32.Transportation 40-47 1.26 0.007 0.86
33.Communications 48 0.00 0.030 0.09
34.Electric, gas, and sanitary
services
49 0.00 0.031 0.50
35.Wholesale trade 50-51 0.00 0.004 0.13













39.Real estate 65 0.00 0.001 0.05
40.Services 70-89 0.00 0.001 0.16
41.Government enterprises and
special industries
91-97 0.00 0.000 0.1258Fullerton
called petrochemicals). Both organic and inorganic chemicals (item 17) are
inputs to the other (untaxed) chemical industry (item 19), and they are
also major inputs to "textile mill products" (item 10) and to "wood preserv-
ing" (item 13).
The third column of Table 2 shows how each environmental tax in
Table 1 is converted into an effective rate of tax on one of the intermedi-
ate inputs of the model.27 In general, each effective tax rate iscalculated
as the observed amount of tax divided by the taxbase (which most often
is the total intermediate use of that input).28 Coal, for example, is pur-
chased primarily by the electric utilities industry (item 34 in Table 2) but
also to some degree by primary metals (item 25) and other industries.
Final demand by consumers is virtually nil. Thus, the observed tax on
coal is divided by total intermediate use of coal to obtain the 2.53 percent
tax rate shown in Table 2. Similarly, the petroleum taxapplied to all
purchases of crude petroleum. Unfortunately, even the most detailed
inputoutput data employ only one industry for "crude petroleumand
natural gas" (item 5), and its "output" is purchased both by refineries
and by utilities. However, virtually all the crude oil is purchasedby
refineries (item 20), whereas the natural gas is purchased by gas distribu-
tion utilities (item 34). Therefore, in the model, the tax is applied not to
all intermediate use of output (item 5), but only to the intermediate use
of item 5 by item 20. The effective rate of tax for both Superfund andthe
OSLTF is 0.69 percent. This rate matches closely the statutory tax rate
($0. 147 per barrel) divided by the average price ofoil (about $20 per
barrel).
Chemical feedstock taxes apply at different rates on various chemicals
used by any industry. Several of the 479 industries that produce taxed
inorganic chemicals are aggregated into one industry (item 17), wherethe
observed tax is divided by total intermediate use to obtain an effective tax
rate of 0.31 percent. Some organic chemicals (item 18) aretaxed as chemi-
cal feedstocks under the Superfund, and some are taxed as ozone-
depleting chemicals. The total of these two taxes divided by total useof
taxed organic chemicals yields the effective tax rate of 0.98 percent.
Many individual chemical products are known to be taxed at ratesthat
approach 2 percent of their price (see Dougherty and Gilson, 1994, pp. 4-
2 to 4-6). Even with 479 industries, however, the inputoutput matrix
27These effective tax rates represent the statutory incidence, that is, the tax that iscollected
on each of these inputs. These tax rates are used here tocalculate the economic incidence,
that is, the increase in the 41 equilibrium output prices.
28The effective tax rates in Table 2 are calculated from tax amounts for 1990 because the
quantities in the inputoutput matrix are for 1990.Why Have Separate Environmental Taxes?59
does not separately identify these individual products. Some of the 479
industries produced only untaxed chemicals, and these were aggregated
into industry (item 19), but most of the chemical industries on this list
produced both taxed and untaxed chemicals. Thus, the categories for
inorganic chemicals (item 17) and organic chemicals (item 18) necessarily
include some untaxed chemicals. Each industry produces one "output"
in the model, so this procedure effectively averages over the taxed and
untaxed goods within an industry and applies a single effective tax rate
to that "output."
Other taxes do not distinguish between intermediate and final pur-
chases, so the effective rate is calculated as the observed tax over total
output. The model then applies this rate to all intermediate purchases to
calculate the effect on production costs in other industries. For example,
the sum of all taxes on motor fuels is divided by total output of "refined
petroleum" (item 20) to obtain the effective tax rate of 6.94 percent
shown in Table 2. The tax on tires is divided by all output of "rubber and
miscellaneous plastics products" (item 22) to get the 0.31 percent rate;
the tax on pistols and revolvers is divided by all "fabricated metal prod-
ucts" (item 26) for the 0.03 percent rate; taxes on trucks and gas guzzlers
are divided by total output of "motor vehicles and transportation equip-
ment" (item 29) to get the 0.39 percent rate; and observed taxes on
transportation of persons and property are divided by total output of
"transportation" (item 32) for the 1.26 percent rate.
Finally, the fourth column of Table 2 shows the effective rate of the
CET. The CET actually applies to part of profits for each firm, namely the
"modified" AMTI over $2 million. A more complicated general equilib-
rium model might be able to calculate the effect of this tax on the wage
rate and the interest rateand thus the extent to which the burden is
passed backward onto labor and capital (see, for example, Shoven and
Whalley, 1984.) Instead, this simpler model assumes fixed economy-
wide rates of return to labor and capital and, therefore, fixed value
added in each industry. The effective tax rate for each industry is calcu-
lated as the CET liability divided by the value added in that industry.
This effective rate then represents the percent increase in value added
that is required for each industry: labor and capital must produce
enough to cover this tax as well as their returns. These higher costs are
reflected in output prices and in the cost to other industries of buying
those outputs as intermediate inputs. The ultimate burden is therefore
passed forward onto consumers.
The Appendix describes equations for each of the 41 industries that
say that the value of output (price times quantity) is equal to the cost of
all the inputs. In long-run equilibrium, no firm receives excess profits.60Fullerton
The cost side includes the price and amount of each intermediate input
and the value added. The prices of nine intermediate inputs are in-
creased by the tax rates in the third column of Table 2, and the value
added is increased by the tax rates in the fourth column. Thus, the 41
equations all involve the 41 prices as well as other variables. Since these
equations are linear, matrix algebra is used to solve for the 41 prices as
functions of the other variables (intermediate inputs, tax rates, and value
added).
In other words, a simultaneous solution for all prices accounts for how
each price depends on all other prices of goods that may be used as
inputs. This procedure considers not only taxes on the nine taxed inter-
mediate goods, but also the increased cost of some other intermediate
inputs that may themselves be produced using one or more of the nine
taxed inputs.
6.2 Results
The percent price increase for each of the 41 outputs is shown in the last
column of Table 2. Even with these nine separate environmental taxes,
only two output prices are affected by more than 1 percent. The price of
refined petroleum (item 20) rises by 1.08 percent, primarily because of
the tax on input of crude oil (item 5). The price of petroleum-related
products (item 21) rises by 2.20 percent because of the increased price of
refined petroleum, plus the additional tax on refined petroleum, plus
the additional tax on the input of organic chemicals (item 18).
The price increase for each good in Table 2 reflects the cost of inputs, not
additional tax on the output. Thus, the 0.86 percent increase in the price of
transportation (item 32) reflects not the tax on the output of the transporta-
tion industry, but increased costs of production from taxes on purchases
of refined petroleum (item 20) and transportation equipment (item 29).
The gross-of-tax price of transportation then increases by the 0.86 percent
price increase and the 1.26 percent tax, a factor of (1.0086)(1.0126) =
1.0213 (a gross increase of 2.13 percent).
An interesting general result in Table 2 is the extent to which every
price rises. Every industry uses some transportation and some electricity
that are produced using taxed fuels that are produced using taxed crude
petroleum. Thus, Congress is not able to target the burden of particular
taxes on particular industries. Another striking result in Table 2 is the
extent of increases in the prices of untaxed goods. The price of agricul-
tural output rises by 0.3 percent, for example, in part because that indus-
try uses fertilizer made from taxed organic chemicals. Textile prices rise
0.3 percent because of the use of agricultural output, chemicals, transpor-
tation, and electricity. Primary metals prices rise 0.4 percent because ofWhy Have Separate Environmental Taxes?61
use of coal, chemicals, electricity, and transportation. Other goods are
then produced using primary metals.
These tax rates and results are shown graphically in Figure 1. The long
solid bars for a few industries are the tax rates, and the many shortopen
bars for all industries are the percent increases in price. The shifting of
burdens looks like mowing the tall weeds down to grass.
Similar diffuse burdens would result from incentive-based taxeson
smokestack emissions or hazardous waste, since these would be paid by
industries that produce goods used by other industries. The spreading
of burden is not itself a problem. It just means that legislated tax policy
cannot achieve the fairness objective of placing burden on a particular
industry.
7. CONCLUSION
Why have separate environmental taxes? A separate tax would be
needed to use incentives to discourage an activity with a negative exter-
nality that harms the environment. A good example would bea tax on a
polluting emission itself rather than on a commodity like gasoline, which
is only weakly correlated with emissions. But attempts to target taxeson
narrowly defined behaviors create costs of measurement, administra-
tion, and compliance. Perhaps for these reasons, as well as for political
reasons, Congress prefers to control emissions and other environmen-
tally damaging activities directly, through command and control regula-
tions such as emission standards on all new vehicles.
Many current taxes might be thought to have environmental effects,
but none of them is a good example of an incentive-based tax. Better
examples might be proposed. The current tax on gasoline is not tied to
emissions of carbon monoxide or hydrocarbons, but vehicle emission
taxes are now becoming feasible (Harrington, Walls, and McConnell,
1994). For another example, a tax on the carbon content of each fuel
would indeed be tied directly to emissions of carbon dioxide thatcause
global warming. For a final example, the Clean Air Act of 1990 currently
hands out sulfur dioxide permits in proportion to past emissions, but it
could be converted to a revenue-raising instrument by selling theper-
mits or by taxing those emissions.
Instead, policymakers use separate taxes to finance the cleanup of
each environmental problem while collecting from the industry thought
to be responsible. But these attempts to target taxes on narrow indus-
tries also create substantial costs of administration and compliance. Each
separate tax has a fixed cost associated with filling out forms and ensur-
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FIGURE 1. Price increase for each final output, withcurrent environ-
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out high, whereas the tax rate and revenue are low. Each tax exhibits
economies of scale, as an increase in the rate can acquire additional
revenue without filling out more forms. A problem, then, is that each
separate environmental tax requires its own forms, imposes a very low
rate, and collects very little revenue.
Finally, these separate taxes and compliance costs do not achieve the
goal of targeting burdens on particular industries. Using an input
output model of the U.S. economy, this paper shows how the burden of
environmental taxes is distributed among all industries. Thus, the high
administrative and compliance costs of having many separate environ-
mental taxes are achieving neither targeted incentives nor targeted bur-
dens. A tiny 0.1 percent increase in broad-based income taxes would
collect the same revenue, have the same diffuse distributional effects,
and create virtually none of the additional administrative and compli-
ance costs.
APPENDIX: INPUTOUTPUT ANALYSIS
The ultimate incidence or burdens on consumers depends on the impact
of each tax on the price of each output. In addition, if some industries
use taxed commodities as intermediate inputs, then the burden is fur-
ther shifted to the consumers of those outputs. Under constant returns
to scale and perfect competition, all increases in costs are passed to
consumers through higher prices. The burden is not only on consumers
of taxed goods, such as chemicals and petroleum, but also on consumers
of goods produced using taxed chemicals and petroleum. These price
effects can be estimated using inputoutput analysis as developed early
in the 1950s by Wassily Leontief (see Leontief, 1986) in a model like that
of Probst et al. (1995).
A.1 Assumptions
Several important assumptions are necessary for the model. First, the
demand for every industry's output is assumed to be large enough to
accommodate plenty of firms that each achieve a scale where costs are
minimized. Entry barriers do not reduce the number of firms or the
extent of competition. Since any change in output can be met by changes
in the number of firms, all operating at minimum cost, the industry is
competitive, and marginal cost is constant. No firm makes abnormal
profits, in the long run, after all prices and outputs have adjusted. The
reasonableness of this assumption can be checked by looking at four-
firm concentration ratios, the percent of each industry output that is64Fullerton
produced by the largest four firms in the industry.29 When this ratio is
less than half, Scherer (1979) concludes that the industry isadequately
competitive. These ratios show that perfect competition and constant
costs are adequate approximations of reality.30
Second, input coefficients are assumed fixed, so each output mustbe
produced using unchanged proportions of each intermediate inputand
the value added. When one input price rises, producers cannotswitch
and use more of a different input. The model thus accountsfor first-
order effects on the price of an output that is produced using amix of
intermediate inputs but not second-order effects on changes in the mix.
Therefore, calculated tax revenue is only an approximation. This assump-
tion captures the effect on output price, so producers maydecrease
output by decreasing all inputs, but it misses the possibilitythat produc-
ers might switch from a taxed input to anuntaxed input.
Third, consider the choice of assumption about internationaltrade. If
each good were traded, and if the imported good were aperfect substi-
tute for the domestically produced good, then anyattempted change in
the price of the domestic good would induce purchasers toswitch en-
tirely to the foreign good. The price of each good in theUnited States
would be completely determined by world markets and would notbe
affected by any domestic tax policy. At the opposite extreme,if the
economy were closed, then thedomestic price of each good could be
determined from information on the costs of production (as in this
model). But this other extreme is too restrictive. Instead, themodel is
still valid under the less restrictive assumption that each foreigngood is
an imperfect substitute for thecorresponding domestic good.31 As long
as the two goods are not identical,then an increase in the price of the
domestic good may induce purchasers to substitute incompletelytoward
the foreign good. This possibility makes the demand forthe domestic
good more elastic, but in this model price is independent of theshape of
the demand curve. The important point here is that the priceof the
domestic good is still determined by the location of the cost curve.
29These concentration ratios can be found in U.S. Department of Commerce(1980). Tax
incidence with imperfect competition is analyzed by Katz and Rosen (1985).
3°More discussion on this point can be found in Fullerton and Tsang (1993) andProbst,
Fullerton, Litan, and Portney (1995).
31This assumption follows Armington (1969). A Ford car is not the same as aVolvo or a
Mercedes, and consumers can substitute between them in a way that depends on their
relative prices. If environmental taxes on inputs raise domestic car output prices,then
some consumers may switch to foreign cars. Thedemand for American cars may fall, but
not to zero. Imperfect substitutability is irrelevant when imports aresubject to the same
taxes as domestic goods.Finally, some indirect effects are ignored. The model is nota general
equilibrium model with multiple factors of production andconsumer
groups with demands for each final output. Thus, it does not account for
changes in wages or the rate of return. For present purposes, the simpler
model provides meaningful and helpful results while avoiding excessive
complications.
A.2 Equations
Assume that the national economy can be aggregated into n industries
and a sector of final demands that includes household and government
purchases. The dollar values of transactions among sectors can be pre-
sented in the following transactions matrix S:
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where p2 represents the price per unit of product i; d is the final demand
for output i; and v represents the value added of the ith industry. Each
row shows the intermediate and final uses of an input, and each column
shows the intermediate and factor inputs of an industry. For example,x21
is the physical quantity of the output from industry 2 that is used by
industry 1. With no loss in generality, the unit price convention defines
the physical unit of each commodity as the amount that sells for $1.
Since all prices are one, dollar volume in equation (1) can be used to
derive the input coefficients. Let x1 be the sum of all demands in row],a
measure of total output. Then define a as the "input coefficient," the





















These input coefficients are assumed constant. This assumptionis useful
and appropriate for calculating first-order effects on thecost of output
from variations in the cost of different inputs, as donehere, but it does
not account for second-order effects, such aschanges in the mix of
inputs. These second-order effects would be necessary toestimate effi-
ciency effects from tax distortions or to estimate tax revenueafter adjust-
ments in behavior.
As long as profits are included in the value added,the sum of all
inputs plus value-added is equal to the value of gross output.Also, the
sum of all intermediate andfinal uses is equal to the value of gross
output. Thus each column sum of matrix (1) isequal to the correspond-
ing row sum:
x11P1+x21P2 + ... + xnlpn + V1 = X1p1,
+x22p2 + ... + x2p + V2 = x2p2, (3)
xlnpl - x2np2 + + xnnPn + Vn = XnPn
Each of these equations is divided by total outputof that industry x1 and
then rearranged and reexpressed using the inputcoefficients to find
(1 - a11)p1 a21p2 - ... a1p = v11x1,
+ (1 -.. - = a)p2 ap
P = (I - A')V. (6)
-a12791
- a1p1 - a2p2 - .. + (1 -ap) = vIx.
















and where I is the identity matrix. If (I - A') is nonsingular,the price
vector can be derived as follows:Why Have Separate Environmental Taxes?67
With the Armington (1969) assumption, each foreign good is not a per-
fect substitute for the corresponding domestic good. Since prices are not
already set by international trade, equation (6) can be used to calculate
the impact of alternative policies on the price vector.
Tax rates on nine intermediate inputs (such as petroleum and chemical
feedstocks) are shown in Table 2. If each intermediate input has its own
tax rate (regardless of where it is used), then equation (3) can be ex-
pressed as follows:
x11p1(1 + t1) + x21p2(1 + t2) + ... + x1p(1 + t) + v1 =
x12p1(1 + t1) + x22p2(1 + t2) ++ x2p(i + t) + v2 = x2p2, (7)
x1p1(1 + t1) + x2p2(1 + t2) ++ xp(1 + t) + v =
Using steps similar to those used in deriving equations (3)(6), then
P = (I - A'T1)1V, (8)
Finally, the CET is added to the model. If all industries face the same
rate of CET, say t, and the AMTI of each industry is a fraction a of the
value added of the ith industry, then
P = (I - A'T1)1TV, (9)
One problem in using the 1987 benchmark inputoutput data is that
the transactions are subdivided into a "make-matrix" (M1), which
shows how much each industry makes of each commodity, and a use-
where











matrix (U1), which shows how much of each commodity is used by
each industry. To derive the industry-by-industry transactions matrix
(S11), divide each entry of M1by its column sum and multiply:
= MxU1. (10)
Including another row and column for the value added and final de-
mand generates the S matrix of equation (1). The next step is to derive
from the units convention and equation (2).
Data for T1 and T are shown in Table 2. For example, petroleum tax
liability for 1990 is divided by intermediate use of crude petroleum by
refineries to obtain t5 of T1. Similarly, the ratio of tax liability for each
chemical divided by total intermediate uses of that chemical provides the
t, for each chemical in T1. The fourth column of Table 2provides the
source for T in 1990.
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